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Comparative Impairment: Louisiana's New Methodology
for Resolving Conflicts of Law
Richard G. Passler*
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana has adopted a new conflicts of law methodology in thirty-
six new code articles approved by the Louisiana Legislature and signed
by the Governor this summer.' The phrasing of the general and residual
code article, Louisiana Civil Code article 3515, of the new conflicts of
law chapter strongly resembles the comparative impairment choice of
law methodology advanced by Professor William F. Baxter. The code
article's comments state that this is because of the article's "negative
formulation" and that "to the extent it is anything more than acoustic,
this resemblance is confined to the most basic premise." 2 Despite the
claims of its drafters, the stated purposes and objectives of Article 3515
seem to go well beyond resembling only the "most basic premises" of
Baxter's comparative impairment methodology. In fact, what is contained
in the general and residual code article and what is in Louisiana's choice
of law future is something very akin to the comparative impairment
process.
The intent of this article is to aid in the understanding of the new
Louisiana choice of law methodology. In light of this, an understanding
of comparative impairment, as originally developed by Professor Baxter,
is extremely helpful and is explained in the first section of this article.
Baxter's comparative impairment method for resolving choice of law
issues has been adopted by the California Supreme Court. The second
section of this article examines the experiences of the California courts
with comparative impairment. The California jurisprudence is relevant
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because the resolution of future choice of law problems in Louisiana
will be resolved by referring to the new code articles contained in Chapter
3 of the Preliminary Title and Book IV of the Louisiana Civil Code,
and specifically the general and residual code article therein, which
strongly resembles comparative impairment. The third section of this
article discusses the general and residual code article and contrasts it
with California's experience with comparative impairment.
II. BAXTER'S COMPARATIVE IMPAIRMENT
Professor William F. Baxter set forth what is currently known as
comparative impairment in his 1963 article entitled Choice of Law and
the Federal System.' When he wrote his article the use of traditional
choice of law rules, such as the law of the place of injury for deciding
a tort case,' was still the accepted method for resolving a conflict between
two states' laws. In his article Baxter set forth two main ideas: (1)
normative principles on which to base choice of law rules are necessary,
and (2) having federal courts express the new choice of law rules is
required.
A. Normative Criteria
Baxter approved of Professor Brainerd Currie's governmental interest
analysis for resolving "false conflict" cases.' However, Baxter rejected
Currie's conclusion that "true conflict" cases should be decided by
applying forum law.' Baxter instead took the analysis used by Currie
one step further, reasoning that "[tihe same analysis by which Currie
distinguishes real [true] from false conflicts cases can resolve real [true)
conflicts cases. ' 7
Baxter used a string of hypotheticals to explain several principles
underlying the comparative impairment method. The first principle was
that "in choice-of-law cases there are two distinct types of governmental
objectives, internal and external." ' The state's internal objectives are
those that come from the policies underlying the laws promulgated by
3. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1963). This
is the only choice of law article written by Professor Baxter; the remainder of his articles
are on antitrust law.
4. Restatement of Conflicts of Law §§ 377, 379 (1934).
5. Baxter, supra note 3, at 8. Currie uses the term "false conflict" to mean a case
in which only one of the states whose laws are at issue has a legitimate interest in applying
its policy. B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 107.10 (1963).
6. Baxter, supra note 3, at 8-9. Currie uses the term "true conflict" to mean a
case in which more than one state whose laws are at issue has a legitimate interest in
applying its policy. B. Currie, supra note 5, at 107-10.
7. Baxter, supra note 3, at 9.
8. Id. at 17.
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a state to resolve conflicting private interests.' The state's external ob-
jective is having other states follow the "resolution of contending private
interests the state has made for local purposes."' 0 That is, State A's
external objective is to have other courts apply its rules in cases involving
State A's private interests. Baxter stated that in a true conflicts case
"the external objective of one state must be subordinated."" It is the
subordination of one interested state's external objectives that leads to
"[tihe choice problem posed [which] is that of allocating spheres of
lawmaking control.' 2
The second principle enunciated by Baxter was the comparative
impairment method for determining which state's external objectives
should be subordinated. "The principle is to subordinate, in the par-
ticular case, the external objective of the state whose internal objective
will be least impaired in general scope and impact by subordination in
cases like the one at hand.' ' 3 The hypotheticals used by Baxter show
the similarity between his approach and Currie's method for distin-
guishing false conflicts from true conflicts. Comparative impairment
requires inquiring into both the internal and external objectives of the
states and applying them to the current fact pattern. Baxter depicted
the method in the following way:
The question "Will the social objective underlying the X rule
be furthered by the application of the rule in cases like the
present one?" need not necessarily be answered "Yes" or "No";
the answer will often be, "Yes, to some extent." The extent to
which the purpose underlying a rule will be furthered by ap-
plication or impaired by nonapplication to cases of a particular
category may be regarded as the measure of the rule's pertinence
and of the state's interest in the rule's application to cases within
the category.' 4
Baxter advocated the comparative impairment methodology because it
established a standard, "normative criterion," for implementing state
policies without sacrificing the ability of people, prior to litigation, to
predict the legal consequences of their actions.' 5
9. Id.
10. Id. "Fact situations which differ only in that they are internal to a single state
have been assessed by the different groups of lawmakers, and each has reached a different
value judgment on the rule best calculated, to serve the overall interest of its community."
Id. at 5.
II. Id. at 17.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id. at 20.
19911
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
B. Using the Federal Courts
Baxter recognized that "the process of resolving choice cases is
necessarily one of allocating spheres of legal control among states. '",
Consequently, he found it a "disquieting prospect" that state courts
would be responsible for balancing conflicting state interests." Baxter
viewed state courts as "active participants in the formulation and im-
plementation of local policies."'" As a result, "(t]o place in their hands
extensive responsibility for deciding when those policies will yield to and
when they will prevail over the competing policies of sister states seems
unsound."' 9 Therefore, Baxter proposed assigning the choice of law
question to the federal courts through the use of diversity jurisdiction. 2
Baxter believed that the intention that federal courts be responsible
for choice of law decisions could be found in the history of the en-
actments of the diversity clause, the full faith and credit clause, and
the Rules of Decision Act.2' As a result, Baxter concluded that the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co.,2 which requires federal courts in diversity cases to
apply the conflicts rules of the state in which the court sits, should be
overruled. 23 In its place, he advocated the adoption of the comparative
impairment methodology as the standard to be used in the application
of both the Rules of Decision Act and the full faith and credit clause.24
This would result in federal courts using the comparative impairment
methodology to initially determine which state's law should be applied
and would lead to a refining of the formulated federal standard. 5
C. Application
Baxter then proposed that the forum court should be required to
refer to the whole law of the state whose objectives would be more
impaired if its policies were not followed as determined by the com-
parative impairment method.26 This, however, does not make the result
reached by the federal court through comparative impairment binding
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 22-23.
18. Id. at 23.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 40-41. In Baxter's view, the "[rlesponsibility for allocating spheres of legal
control among member states of a federal system cannot be placed elsewhere than with
the federal government." Id. at 23.
21. Id. at 33-42.
22. 313 U.S. 487. 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
23. Baxter, supra note 3, at 41.42.
24. Id. at 42.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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on the forum court. When the forum court refers to the whole internal
law of the state indicated by comparative impairment, including that
state's conflicts laws, it may find that that state would not apply its
own law but would apply the law of the other state. Thus, if the choice
of law method used by the state to which comparative impairment points
reaches an opposite result, the state whose policies which would be more
impaired would find its state's objectives being impaired rather than
being furthered as provided for under comparative impairment. Baxter
did not like this result and indicated that although they could not be
required to do so, every state should adopt the comparative impairment
method as a part of its conflicts laws.27
III. THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE
Baxter never intended for a state court to adopt the comparative
impairment method before the principle was already being used in the
federal system. Thirteen years after his article was published, however,
the comparative impairment method, stripped of its federal law com-
ponent, was adopted in California.2
27. Id.
28. Recently, Idaho, Missouri, and the District of Columbia claimed to have adopted
the comparative impairment method. What these jurisdictions have actually adopted,
however, appears to be some sort of a conglomeration of several methods of resolving
conflict of law issues.
Citing Baxter, Horowitz, Leflar, and Currie, the Supreme Court of Idaho used "com-
parative impairment," "weighing of interests," and "better law" analyses to "conclude
that Idaho as the forum state has the most significant interest in having its law applied."
Barringer v. State, Ill Idaho 794, 798-99, 727 P.2d 1222, 1226-27 (1986).
The Missouri Court of Appeals, citing Currie and Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental
Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d.157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978), noted that "[a) number
of states have adopted a conflict resolution rule referred to variously as the governmental
interest analysis, the flexible governmental interest approach, the comparative impairment
of state policies, or advancement of the forum's governmental interest." Hicks v. Graves
Truck Lines, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 439, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted). The
Missouri court then went on to state that "we conclude the government interest analysis
offers the better method for resolving true conflict of laws cases, that is, cases in which
the Restatement, § 145 test discloses significant contacts with two or more states, each
of which has a legitimate local interest in the particular issue in contest." Id. (emphasis
added). Just five paragraphs later the Missouri court stated "We conclude ... that the
doctrine of comparative impairment should be adopted to resolve choice of law cases in
which the facts indicate significant contacts with Missouri and another state under the
Restatement § 145 test and in which both states have legitimate state interests in the law
choice." Id. at 445 (emphasis added). The use of comparative impairment in Hicks was
distinguished by a later Missouri appellate panel. Markway v. State Farm Ins. Co., 799
S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals never specifically stated that it had adopted
comparative impairment, but after citing Currie, Baxter, Horowitz, and Bernhard v.
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A. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club
Comparative impairment was expressly adopted by a unanimous
California Supreme Court as part of the state's law of conflicts in
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club.2 9 The events leading to the case began on
July 24, 1971, when Fern and Philip Myers drove to Harrah's, a Nevada
gambling casino. In the early morning hours of July 25, 1971, having
consumed so many alcoholic drinks as to "reach a point of obvious
intoxication rendering them incapable of safely driving a car,''30 the
Myers began the trip back to their California residence. Fern Myers,
while driving intoxicated on a California highway, allowed the car to
drift across the center line into oncoming traffic, resulting in a head-
on collision with a motorcycle driven by another California resident,
Richard A. Bernhard. As a result of severe injuries caused by the
-accident, Bernhard filed suit in a California court against Harrah's
alleging that it was negligent in continuing to serve alcoholic drinks to
the obviously intoxicated Myers and that this negligence was the prox-
imate cause of his injuries.
Nevada law did not impose civil liability on a tavern owner under
the circumstances presented in the case.' On the other hand, California
law did impose liability on a tavern owner for injuries to a third person
Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
859, 97 S. Ct. 159 (1976), the court indicated that it "finds this method of analysis
compelling and persuasive." Estrada v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 488 A.2d 1359, 1361
n.4 (D.C. 1985). The comparative impairment method was subsequently used by the court.
Stutsman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 546 A.2d 367, 376 (D.C. 1988).
It has also been suggested that New York should adopt the comparative impairment
approach. Comment, New York's Choice of Law Quagmire Revisited, 51 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 579, 583, 608 (1985).
29. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859,
97 S. Ct. 159 (1976). It was suggested two years prior to Bernhard in Professor Harold
Horowitz's restatement of California conflicts law that the comparative impairment method
was already being used in California. One of three principles to resolve true conflicts
according to Horowitz's restatement was the application of a "standard of 'comparative
impairment': which state's policy will be least impaired if it is subordinated?" Horowitz,
The Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement,, 21 UCLA L. Rev. '719, 723
(1974). Horowitz described "[tlhe key element in the inquiry as to whether one state has
a greater interest than does another state in having its policy prevail is the 'comparative
impairment' approach described by Professor Baxter: Which state's interest would be
more impaired if its policy were subordinated?" Id. at 748. He then suggested that the
comparative impairment method, even if not its terminology, was used by the California
Supreme Court as far back as 1858 in a slavery case, Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147 (1858).
Horowitz, supra, at 748-49.
The Bernhard court also recognized the use of the comparative impairment analysis but
not its terminiology in People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480
(1957). Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 321-22, 546 P.2d at 724, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
30. Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 315, 546 P.2d at 720, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
31. Id. at 317, 546 P.2d at 721, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
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proximately caused by continued service to an intoxicated patron.,' The
choice of law analysis, therefore, would determine whether Harrah's
owed any duty to Bernhard.
The Bernhard court began its choice of law analysis with Professor
Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis." The court found Nev-
ada's purpose for denying civil liability was to protect Nevada tavern
owners from being subject "to ruinous exposure every time [they] poured
a drink."13 4 The court found California's law, which imposed civil liability
on tavern owners, was designed to protect California residents injured
by intoxicated drivers in California.3" In the case the court was faced
with a California plaintiff seeking recovery for injuries received in Cal-
ifornia and a Nevada defendant seeking protection from civil liability;
therefore, each state had an interest in having its law applied. Thus,
based on these interests, the court easily concluded that "[ilt goes without
saying that these interests conflict." 36 From this the California Supreme
Court found that "for the first time since applying a governmental
interest analysis as a choice of law doctrine . . .we are confronted with
a 'true' conflicts case." 3
After acknowledging and rejecting Currie's original position that the
forum state should apply its own law when faced with a true conflict,"
the court shifted to Currie's later stance that "the forum should re-
examine its policy to determine if a more restrained interpretation of
it is more appropriate." 9 This reexamination was to be done by a
"moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the
circumstances in which it [the local policy] must be applied to effectuate
the forum's legitimate purpose."' 4 The court then concluded that this
reexamination should be conducted using the comparative impairment
method . 4 Thus, the California Supreme Court summarized its analysis:
32. Id., 546 P.2d at 721, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 217. Although California statutory law
does not have a Dram Shop Act, the California Supreme Court had created a jurisprudential
one based on several statutes.
33. Id. at 316, 546 P.2d at 720-21, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17. Professor Currie's
writings on governmental interest analysis may be found in B. Currie, Selected essays on
the Conflict of Laws (1963).
34. Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 318, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
.35. Id., 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
36. Id. at 318-19, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
37. Id. at 319, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218. Previous cases had presented
false conflicts and unprovided for situations.
38. Id. at 319-20, 546 P.2d at 722-23, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
39. Id. at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219. See Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 754, 757 (1963).
40. Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
41. Id., 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The court interchangeably cited
Baxter's article and Horowitz's article without attempting to distinguish them. Id. at 319-
21, 546 P.2d at 723-24, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20.
1991]
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Once [the] preliminary analysis has identified a true conflict of
the governmental interests involved as applied to the parties
under the particular circumstances of the case, the "comparative
impairment" approach to the resolution of such conflict seeks
to determine which state's interest would be more impaired if
its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.
This analysis proceeds on the principle that true conflicts should
be resolved by applying the law of the state whose interest would
be more impaired if its law were not applied'.4
The court went on to explain that the analysis does not require the
court to:
"weigh" the conflicting governmental interests in the sense of
determining which conflicting law manifested the "better" or
the "worthier" social policy on the specific issue. An attempted
balancing of conflicting state policies in that sense ... is difficult
to justify in the context of a federal system in which, within
constitutional limits, states are empowered to mold their policies
as they wish . . .4
Rather, the court described the analysis as a process in which conflicting
state policies are made to accommodate each other based on the intended
scope of these policies." Thus, a court is required to analyze the ap-
propriate scope of the conflicting state policies instead of the quality
of those policies.
The California Supreme Court found it unnecessary to determine
how far the scope of the California policy imposing civil liability on
tavern owners should be extended.4'5 This was because Harrah's solicited
California residents to come to Nevada and served them alcoholic bev-
erages beyond the point of intoxication when it was probable that these
people would then return to California in the intoxicated condition. By
doing so, Harrah's put itself "at the heart of California's regulatory
interest, namely to prevent tavern keepers from selling alcoholic beverages
to obviously intoxicated persons who are likely to act in California in
the intoxicated state."" California's policy would therefore be signifi-
cantly impaired if California policy was not applied to Harrah's. 7
42. Id. at 320, 546 P.2d at 723. 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
43. Id., 546 P.2d at 723-24, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.20 (quoting Horowitz, The Law
of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement. 21 UCLA L. Rev. 719, 753 (1974)
(footnote omitted)).
44. Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 320-21, 546 P.2d at 724, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
45. Id. at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
46. Id., 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
47. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
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Conversely, the court found that since Nevada had already subjected
its tavern owners to criminal penalties for further providing an intox-
icated person with alcoholic beverages, subjecting Harrah's to civil li-
ability in California would not greatly impair Nevada's interests even
though under the same facts Nevada would not subject Harrah's to civil
liability. To the California Supreme Court, "the imposition of such
liability involves an increased economic exposure, which, at least for
businesses which actively solicit extensive California patronage, is a
foreseeable and coverable business expense."148 Therefore, Nevada's in-
terest in protecting Nevada tavern owners from unlimited civil liability
would only be impaired when the Nevada tavern owner actively solicited
California business. Thus, the court, using the comparative impairment
choice of law analysis, concluded "that California has an important
and abiding interest in applying its rule of decision to the case at bench,
[and] that the policy of this state would be more significantly impaired
[than the policy of the state of Nevada] if such rule were not applied." 4 9
B. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.
Two years later the California Supreme Court, once again unani-
mously, used the comparative impairment method in Offshore Rental
Co. v. Continental Oil Co..50 The plaintiff in the case was Offshore
Rental Company, Inc. ("Offshore"), a California corporation, which
leased oil drilling equipment in the Louisiana Gulf Coast area. The
defendant, Continental Oil Company ("Continental"), was a Delaware
corporation, headquartered in New York, and doing business in many
states including Louisiana and California. Offshore. sent Howard C.
Kaylor, the vice-president responsible for obtaining contracts, to Louis-
iana to confer with representatives of Continental. While on Continen-
tal's premises in Louisiana, Kaylor was injured through the negligence
of Continental employees. After Kaylor was compensated for his injuries
by Continental, Offshore brought suit in California for $5 million in
damages for the loss of the services of a "key" employee.
The California Supreme Court found that Louisiana law did not
allow a corporate plaintiff a cause of action for the loss of an officer's
services.5 ' Conversely, the court found that California cases, "although
48. Id., 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. In this manner the court suggested
the owners of such business should purchase insurance.
49. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 725-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.
50. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
51. Id. at 162, 583 P.2d at 724, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870. See Bonfanti Indus. Inc. v.
Teke, Inc., 224 So. 2d 15 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ refused, 254 La. 779, 226 So. 2d
770 (1969), interpreting La. Civ. Code art. 174 (1952), repealed by 1990 La. Acts No.
705 § 1, which allowed a master a cause of action for the beating or maiming of his
servant. The repeal of this statute strengthens Louisiana's policy of not recognizing a
cause of action for the loss of an officer's services.
1991]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
chiefly [in] dicta," supported Offshore's contention that California law
granted a cause of action to a party for the loss of a key employee
due to injury caused by the negligence of a third party."2 The California
Supreme Court then "assumeld], for the purpose of analysis," that
California law did in fact grant such a cause of action.3 Thus, the
choice of law analysis was to be determinative of whether Offshore's
cause of action (and therefore its case) against Continental would be
allowed to proceed.
The court began its choice of law analysis by using Currie's gov-
ernmental interest analysis to determine whether it was faced with a
false or true conflict. The analysis involved examining the policies un-
derlying each state's law to discuss whether each state had an interest
in seeing its law applied to the present case. 4 Based on Louisiana case
law indicating that Louisiana did not grant a cause of action in these
circumstances because doing so would produce "undesirable social and
legal consequences," 5 the California Supreme Court decided the purpose
of the Louisiana policy was "to protect negligent resident tort-feasors
acting within Louisiana's borders from the financial hardships caused
by the assessment of excessive legal liability or exaggerated claims re-
sulting from the loss of services of a key employee." 5 6 The court found
California's policy was to protect California employers from economic
losses resulting from the negligent injuring of a key employee by a third
party regardless of whether the injury occurred within the state of
California." In Offshore the court was faced with a California corporate
plaintiff seeking recovery for the loss of the services of a key employee
who was negligently injured in Louisiana by a defendant doing business
in Louisiana; therefore, both states were interested in having their own
52. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 162, 583 P.2d at 724, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870. The cause
of action was based on Section 49(c) of the California Civil Code which provides: "The
rights of personal relations forbid: ... (c) Any injury to a servant which affects his
ability to serve his master, other than seduction, abduction or criminal conversation."
Cal. Civ. Code § 49(c) (Deering 1990). The California Supreme Court has since modified
its opinion in Offshore, concluding that this subsection "does not provide a right of
action for a corporate employer seeking recovery for expenses and lost profits incurred
as a result of negligent injury to its employees." I. J. Weinrot and Son, Inc. v. Jackson,
40 Cal. 3d 327, 341, 708 P.2d 682, 691, 220 Cal. Rptr. 103, 112 (1985).
53. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 163, 583 P.2d at 724, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
54. Id. at 163, 583 P.2d at 724-25, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
55. Id. at 163, 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (quoting Bonfanti Indus. v.
Teke, Inc., 224 So. 2d 15, 17 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 254 La. 779, 226 So.
2d 770 (1969)).
56. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 163-64, 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
57. Id. at 164, 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871. The court reasoned that
even when the injury occurred outside the state California's economy and tax revenues
would nonetheless be affected.
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law applied. Thus, the court concluded that Louisiana and California
law conflicted and that there was a true conflict which must be resolved."
The court began its discussion by turning to its decision in Bernhard
v. Harrah's Club. It noted that in Bernhard it had rejected the automatic
application of forum law when faced with a true conflict. 9 The court
then quoted a large portion of the Bernhard analysis describing the
comparative impairment method.60 After describing the resolution of true
conflict cases as "essentially a process of allocating respective spheres
of lawmaking influence,"'" the California Supreme Court then further
refined its application of the comparative impairment method.
The court added several factors to the inquiry to be made in the
allocation process. First, when possible, the court should determine
whether the policies underlying the states' laws were more "strongly
held" in the past than at the present.62 Second, the court should consider
whether "one of the competing laws is archaic and isolated in the
context of the laws of the federal union, [and if it finds that it is] it
may not unreasonably have to yield to the more prevalent and progressive
law, other factors of choice being roughly equal."63 Third, the court
should consider whether the law, even within its own state, is "infre-
quently enforced or interpreted." The purpose of these factors is to
determine the current status of a statute and whether its use should be
limited to solely domestic matters.65 The final "chief criterion in the
comparative impairment analysis is the 'maximum attainment of un-
derlying purpose by all governmental entities. This necessitates identifying
the focal point of concern of the contending lawmaking groups and
ascertaining the comparative pertinence of that concern to the immediate
case."'" The California Supreme Court summarized "the comparative
impairment approach to the resolution of true conflicts [as an attempt]
to determine the relative commitment of the respective states to the laws
involved. The approach incorporates several factors for consideration:
58. Id., 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
59. Id. at 164, 583 P.2d at 725-26, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
60. Id. at 164-65, 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872. See supra notes 41-44
and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 165, 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (quoting Baxter, supra note
3, at 11-12). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
62. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 165, 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
63. Id., 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872. (quoting Freund, Chief Justice Stone
and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1216 (1946)).
64. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 166, 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
65. Id., 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
66. Id., 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (quoting Baxter, supra note 3, at
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the history and current status of the states' laws; the function and
purpose of those laws."16
Turning to the history and current status of the laws at issue in
Offshore, the California Supreme Court found that the Louisiana statute
creating a cause of action for the loss of a servant's services only applied
to 'indentured servants, apprentices and others who are bound in the
service of an individual for a specific period of time' and not to 'the
class of free servants."'6 8 Therefore, Louisiana law concurred with the
law in a majority of states in not recognizing a cause of action for a
corporate plaintiff for the loss of a key employee's services due to the
negligent action of a third party. 69
In looking at the California law which the court had assumed to
create a cause of action for Offshore, the court noted that not only
had no California court ever actually held that such an action existed
for the loss of a corporate employee, but also that no California court
had even addressed the issue in many years. The court therefore con-
cluded that California had little interest in having its "unusual and
outmoded statute" applied to the case while Louisiana had a strong
interest in having its "prevalent and progressive" law applied. 0
The court then attempted to provide further support for its decision,
noting that "although the law of the place of the wrong is not necessarily
the applicable law for all tort actions, the situs of the injury remains
a relevant consideration." 7' In applying this extra factor to the case,
the court pointed out that the accident giving rise to the suit had occurred
in Louisiana; thus to impose liability on Continental "would strike at
the essence of a compelling Louisiana law" for "[a]t the heart of
Louisiana's denial of liability lies the vital interest in promoting freedom
of investment and enterprise within Louisiana's borders, among investors
incorporated both in Louisiana and elsewhere."172 Therefore, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that Louisiana's interests would be more
impaired than those of California and that Louisiana law, which did
not recognize a cause of action for a corporate plaintiff such as Offshore
under the facts presented in the case, should be applied."
67. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 166, 583 P.2d at 727, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
68. Id. at 167 n.10, 583 P.2d at 727 n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 873 n.10 (quoting
Bonfanti Indus., Inc. v. Teke, Inc., 224 So. 2d 15, 17 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused,
254 La. 779, 226 So. 2d 770 (1969)).
69. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 168, 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
70. Id., 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
71. Id., 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (citation omitted).
72. Id., 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
73. Id. at 169, 583 P.2d at 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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C. Post Bernhard and Offshore
1. California Commentators
The California Supreme Court has not received much support or
approval for its adoption of comparative impairment. California com-
mentators have attacked the court's adoption of the method and have
even argued for a return to Currie's governmental interest analysis . 4
The Bernhard and Offshore decisions, which established comparative
impairment in California, have not escaped attack either. Two articles
specifically addressing the topic have been published, one authored by
Professor Herma Hill Kay of the University of California at Berkeley,
Boalt Hall School of Law and the other by Professor Leo Kanowitz of
the University of California, Hastings College of Law."
a. Kay
Professor Kay felt that when Justice Sullivan indicated in Bernhard
that for the first time the court was faced with a true conflict, Sullivan
was actually faced with an apparent true conflict. 76 At this point, Kay
felt "Justice Sullivan went astray ... mistakenly stat[ing] that [the
forum's reexamination of its policy when a preliminary analysis reveals
an apparent conflict] could, consistent with governmental interest anal-
ysis, be performed under Baxter's principle of comparative impair-
ment." 7 7 Use of comparative impairment was not proper at this stage.
This is the stage at which Currie would have used his moderate and
restrained interpretation step in an attempt to eliminate the apparent
true conflict and the use of forum law; while Baxter, who would use
comparative impairment to resolve both true conflicts and apparent true
conflicts, would not reexamine the forum's policy. Thus, the effect of
what Justice Sullivan did was to merge comparative impairment with
Currie's step of moderate and restrained interpretation.
Professor Kay made it clear that the use of comparative impairment
method in conjunction with governmental interest analysis as employed
by Justice Sullivan was not supported by Currie, Baxter, or Horowitz,"8
on whom Justice Sullivan relied. According to Kay, the use of "com-
74. Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Eval-
uation of the California Experience, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 577, 609 (1980); Kanowitz, Com-
parative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 Hastings
L.J. 255 (1978); Note, After Hurtado and Bernhard: Interest Analysis and the Search for
a Consistent Theory for Choice-of-Law Cases, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1976).
75. Kay, supra note 74; Kanowitz, supra note 74.
76. Kay, supra note 74, at 583. See supra text accompanying note 37.
77. Id. at 583.
78. See supra note 29.
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parative impairment at what Currie could call the apparent true conflict
stage has led [California courts) to be overly hasty in identifying true
conflicts. Indeed, the courts have seemed anxious to bring comparative
impairment analysis into play as quickly as possible."179
Kay was equally displeased by Justice Tobriner's use of comparative
impairment in Offshore. She pointed out that unlike Justice Sullivan
who merged comparative impairment with the moderate and restrained
interpretation step, Justice Tobriner eliminated the step and proceeded
directly to the use of comparative impairment, the result of which was
to "resolv[e] true conflict cases, rather than minimiz[e] their occur-
rence."s 0
Professor Kay was greatly concerned with Justice Tobriner's expan-
sion of the comparative impairment analysis. She pointed out that the
addition of a factor which requires testing the "current vitality" of the
state's policy goes directly against what Baxter had in mind.8 This
additional factor allows courts to make "super-value judgments," which
was precisely what Baxter had intended for the comparative impairment
method to avoid. In fact, "the very passage quoted by Tobriner ...
is itself cited by Baxter as an.example of the type of super-value judgment
that comparative impairment analysis would avoid." 82
Professor Kay found several negative side effects from the use of
the comparative impairment method by the California courts. As earlier
indicated, courts have been too quick to conclude that they are faced
with a true conflict because "the present California judges seem to find
the comparative impairment approach so satisfactory that they are willing
to invent excuses for its use." 83 Kay points out that in the fifteen years
between the adoption of a kind of governmental interest analysis in
196184 and the adoption of comparative impairment in 1976 by the
Bernhard court a true conflicts case had not been identified by a Cal-
ifornia court.8 In the next three years, however, three more true conflict
cases were identified." According to Kay, this haste in identifying true
conflicts has resulted in "some California courts hav[ing] failed to
79. Kay, supra note 74, at 586.
80. Id. at 588.
81. Id. at 588-89.
82. Id. at 589 n.76 (citing Baxter, supra note 3, at 18 n.39). See supra text accom-
panying note 63.
83. Kay, supra note 74, at 604-05.
84. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
85. Kay, supra note 74, at 604.
86. Id. The three cases were Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal.
3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978), Duarte v. McKenzie Constr. Co., 152
Cal. Rptr. 373 (1979) (not officially reported), and Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp., 93
Cal. App. 3d 384, 155 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1979). Cable is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 105-10.
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examine with care and precision the content of local policy" and the
placement of "an unnecessary strain on interstate harmony." 87 Kay's
point is exemplified by the court's assumption in Offshore that California
law provided the plaintiff a cause of action; seven years later the court
did analyze the California law in question and concluded that the cause
of action did not exist.88
Kay concluded that the use of the comparative impairment method
did not produce an increase in the uniformity of result in conflicts of
law cases.89 Therefore, she advocated that California courts return to
the application of forum law when governmental interest analysis in-
dicates a true conflict.9°
b. Kanowitz
Professor Kanowitz also called for a return to Currie's method for
resolving true conflicts. He found comparative impairment to be indis-
tinguishable from the fifth of Professor Robert Leflar's five choice-
influencing considerations, the application of the better rule of law. 9'
The weighing of interests for the purpose of a comparative-
impairment analysis, that is, in order to determine which state's
interests are more intensely held or the relative reach of each
state's policies and interests, is thus hardly distinguishable from
a weighing to determine which is the better or worthier law.92
Kanowitz pointed to Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court" as an
example of the lack of difference between the two methods, "or, at
the very least, that these two functions [comparative impairment and
value-weighing] are readily confused by the courts."'' In Beech Aircraft,
the California appellate court's discussion of the conflicts of law issue
took place "under a subheading in the opinion entitled, 'The Lower
Court Should Weigh the Following Facts and Policies in Determining
Choice of Law." '"5
Additionally, Kanowitz found the analysis used by the court in
Offshore to be a "better law" analysis "despite its insistence that it is
87. Kay, supra note 74, at 605-06.
88. See supra note 52.
89. Kay, supra note 74, at 610-14.
90. Id.
91. Kanowitz, supra note 74, at 277 and 286. See also Leflar, Conflicts Law: More
on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1584 (1966).
92. Kanowitz, supra note 74, at 277 (citation omitted).
93: 61 Cal. App. 3d 501, 132 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976).
94. Kanowitz, supra note 74, at 281-83.
95. Id. at 282. (quoting Beech Aircraft, 61 Cal. App. 3d at 521, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
552 (emphasis added)).
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adhering to a comparative-impairment analysis.'' 96 Thus, Kanowitz con-
cluded that the comparative impairment method's "imprecision, its ma-
nipulability in according greater or lesser weight or significance to the
respective interests, and its propensity to engage in interest-counting"
rendered it indistinguishable from a weighing of interests to find the
better or worthier law.97
2. California Appellate Cases
Since the California Supreme Court's decision in Bernhard and
Offshore, the California Courts of Appeal have found that they were
faced with a true conflict which required the use of the comparative
impairment method only five times."
a. Hall v. University of Nevada
In Hall v. University of Nevada" the plaintiffs were injured in an
automobile accident when their vehicle was struck by a car driven by
an employee of the University of Nevada who was engaged in official
university business in California. At issue on appeal was whether a
Nevada statute which limited the state's liability to $25,000 per claimant
would apply even though the plaintiffs had been awarded a judgment
of $1,500,000.'0 The court of appeal concluded that the trial court had
properly refused to apply the Nevada limitation based on several factors,
including that California's conflicts of law methodology did not require
the Nevada statute's application.
In looking at Nevada's policies for the purpose of comparative
impairment analysis, the court found that "Nevada advances as its policy,
the fact that if liability were not limited, its residents would suffer
financially, due to the increased cost of insurance for Nevada vehicles
being operated outside the state."'' ° The court also noted that "Cali-
fornia's policy interest lies in providing full protection to those who are
injured on its highways through the negligence of both residents and
nonresidents."' 02 Based on these policies the court concluded that "the
96. Kanowitz, supra note 74, at 294.
97. Id. at 293.
98. The number would actually be six if one included Duarte v. McKenzie Constr.
Co., 152 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1979), which is an opinion not officially published.
99. 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S. Ct.
1182 (1979).
100. In an earlier case the California Supreme Court ruled that the state of Nevada
had waived its sovereign immunity and was subject to suit in California. Hall v. University
of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
820, 94 S. Ct. 114 (1973).
101. Id. at 285, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
102. Id. at 285-86, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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policy reasons for applying California law herein [are] even stronger
than those found in Bernhard."'' 3 The court pointed out that in Bernhard
the defendant's culpable conduct had occurred completely within Nevada
while in this case the defendant's actions took place completely in
California. As a result of "utilizing the public highways within out [sic]
state to conduct its business, Nevada should fully expect to be held
accountable under California's laws."' z°
b. Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp.
In Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp.,101 the defendant was sued under
the same theory used in Bernhard as a result of a one car accident in
Nevada which injured a passenger who was a California resident. Ap-
plying comparative impairment to the case the court "conclude[d] that
the imposition of civil liability upon commercial purveyors of intoxicating
beverages would impair Nevada's interest more significantly than the
denial of such liability would impair California's interest."' s
After finding that a true conflict existed in the same manner as the
California Supreme Court did in Bernhard, the Cable court turned to
the comparative impairment method. The court pointed out that the
California legislature had amended the statute on which the civil liability
of tavern keepers had been based, making it "apparent that it has not
been the policy of the California Legislature to protect Californians by
regulating tavern keepers in Nevada."'10 The Cable court therefore con-
cluded that the policy was limited to the Bernhard decision which "relates
only to Nevada conduct causing injury in California."'' 10 The court also
recognized that "[tihe 'current status' of California law with respect to.
liability based upon provision of intoxicating beverages is that it has
been repudiated."'"19 Thus, the court concluded that "it is obvious that
the impairment of such a repudiated policy has a minimal effect upon
California's governmental interest.""10
103. Id. at 286, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
104. Id.
105. 93 Cal. App. 3d 384, 155 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1979).
106. Id. at 390, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
107. Id. at 395, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
108. Id. at 395-96, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78. This analysis by the court has caused
one commentator to write that in his opinion "while cast in the language of comparative
impairment, [the analysis in Cable] is an example of moderate and restrained reinterpre-
tation of the forum's policy." Kay, supra note 74, at 593.
109. Cable, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 398, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
110. Id., 155 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
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c. Nicolet, Inc. v. Superior Court
In Nicolet, Inc. v. Superior Court," the court was faced with actions
brought by manufacturers against their insurers for bad faith in their
refusal to defend and indemnify the manufacturers against asbestos
claims in which the manufacturers sought both punitive and compen-
satory damages. The court first addressed the insurers based in Penn-
sylvania and then the insurers based in England.
The court reasoned that, while Pennsylvania probably would not
allow punitive damages when an insurer was guilty of bad faith, Cal-
ifornia would allow punitive damages; therefore, there was a true con-
flict." 2 California's objectives were "public protection and the sanctity
of contract.""' 3 Pennsylvania's objective was the "financial protection
of its resident insurance companies in the out of state conduct of their
business. ' '" 4 The court noted that a Pennsylvania court had recently
come down on the other side of the punitive damage issue, overruling
the granting of a demurrer to a punitive damage claim." 5 The court
specifically indicated that this one decision did not make "Pennsylvania's
seeming rejection of punitive damages . . 'archaic' and 'isolated." 1' 6
The court concluded, however, that since the insurer had done business
in California, "the interest of California in providing assurance to all
of its citizens that rejection of any insurance claim will not be made
in bad faith with impunity is paramount, and justifies invocation of its
own law in cases brought in this state.""'
In turning to the insurer based in England, the court also assumed
that an English court would not allow punitive damages, and therefore
the court was again faced with a true conflict."' The court concluded,
."[Flor reasons cited at length in this opinion, we believe that California's
is the governing law on the subject of punitive damages."" 9
d. Zimmerman v. Allstate Insurance Co.
In Zimmerman v. Allstate Insurance Co.,'2 0 the court was faced
with a suit brought against an insurer by a third party for bad faith.
i11. 224 Cal. Rptr. 408 (Cal. Ct. App.), review granted, 719 P.2d 987, 227 Cal. Rptr.
391 (1986), review dismissed as moot, 736 P.2d 319, 236 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1987).
112. Nicolet, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
113. Id. at 417.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 416 n.6.
116. Id. at 418.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 420.
119. Id.
120. 179 Cal. App. 3d 840, 224 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1986).
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The plaintiff, then a resident of Illinois, had been injured in Oklahoma
in an automobile accident with the defendant's insured, an Oklahoma
resident. Subsequent to his recovery from his injuries, he moved to
California.
The court recognized that there was a true conflict because Okla-
homa, unlike California, did not recognize a cause of action by a third
party against an insurer for bad faith.'' Noting that "the only factor
supporting plaintiff's claim of California governmental interest in this
case is his status as a resident of this state, who will be uncompensated
for the alleged wrongs of defendant," the court refused to hold that
California law should apply because doing so would encourage forum
shopping.' m The court found this to be "of particular concern in a bad
faith insurance action, where the plaintiff may complain of a course of
conduct occurring over a period, of time, during which plaintiff may at
any point change his residence to a more favorable locale without
notifying the defendant.'1 2 Another result would be to:
abrogate the interest of a jurisdiction such as Oklahoma in the
application of its law to a situation arising out of an insurance
policy written in Oklahoma, insuring a Oklahoma resident for
an accident that occurred in that state, and where the complained
of conduct of the insurer occurred, although its effect was upon
a third party residing in California.
2 4
Thus, the court concluded that Oklahoma was the state with the greater
interest. 125
e. Denham v. Farmers Insurance Co.
In Denham v. Farmers Insurance Co.,126 the court was also faced
with a third party bad faith claim against an insurer. The plaintiff's
injuries resulted from an automobile accident in Nevada. involving a
Nevada resident. As in Zimmerman, the state of Nevada, like Oklahoma,
did not recognize the cause of action.
The court recognized a California interest in protecting its residents
from the unfair trade practices of insurers. The court also recognized
Nevada interests in regulating insurers in Nevada, protecting Nevada
insureds, and, as it did not recognize a cause of action for a third party
121. Id. at 845-46, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 919-20.
122. Id. at 847, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
123. Id., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
124. Id., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
125. Although this is not the language of comparative impairment, it is the language
used by the court.
126. 213 Cal. App. 3d 1061, 262 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1989).
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against an insurer for bad faith, "an interest in protecting its defendant
insurers as well as its insureds since Nevada insureds would ultimately
bear the cost of extending the insurer's liability to third persons."' 1'2
Thus, the court concluded that there was a true conflict and comparative
impairment would be used.
The court noted that the California Supreme Court had decided
since Zimmerman that California law did not create the cause of action
against insurers who commit unfair trade practices.'n The court con-
cluded, however, that the decision did not apply in Denham, because
it did not apply to actions filed before the date of its ruling if the
insured's liability had been conclusively determined, as was done here.2 9
Thus, the court concluded that "California's interest in applying its law
(was] clearly not as strong."' 30 The court also considered that the injury
had occurred in Nevada, citing Offshore and its statement that the situs
of the injury was still relevant. 3' The final, and deciding, factor considered
by the court was that California's only interest was that the plaintiffs
were California residents. After extensively quoting from Zimmerman on
that issue, the court concluded that Nevada law should apply."'
3. Federal Cases
In the fifteen years since California's adoption of the comparative
impairment method, the federal courts, in applying California's conflicts
law, have also used the comparative impairment method to resolve true
conflicts. Three Ninth Circuit court panels,' 33 one Seventh Circuit panel,' 3'
six federal district courts sitting in California,' and seven other federal
district courts"M have found themselves faced with a true conflict, making
127. Id. at 1066, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
128. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250
Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
129. Denham, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1065, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
130. Id. at 1066-67, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
131. Id. at 1067, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
132. Id., 262 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
133. Rosenthal v. Fonda, 862 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1988); Roesgen v. American Home
Prods. Corp., 719 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1983); Lettieri v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
of U.S., 627 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1980).
134. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, II., 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Lin v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 U.S. 878, 102 S. Ct. 358 (1981).
135. McNall v. Tatham, 676 F. Supp. 987 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Federal Savings and
Loan Ins. Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 661 F. Supp. 246 (C.D. Cal. 1987); In re
Pizza Time Theater Sec. Litigation, 112 F.R.D. 15 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Hernandez v.
Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 583 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Camp v. Forwarders
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the use of comparative impairment necessary. The opinions of the courts
faithfully cite Bernhard and Offshore; however, they do not at all
properly apply the comparative impairment method as adopted by the
California Supreme Court in those decisions.'3 7 The opinions of the
Seventh Circuit and of a federal district court sitting in Illinois even go
so far as to state that if an apparent conflict exists, a moderate and
restrained interpretation of the states' laws should be applied; if such
an analysis then fails to reveal only one state having a legitimate interest
in having its law applied, the court is faced with a true conflict to
which the comparative impairment method should be applied.3 8 Another
federal district court, sitting in Michigan, also stated that it interpreted
California law the same way'3 9 utilizing a moderate and restrained in-
terpretation of the state's laws to conclude that only one state had a
legitimate interest and therefore, "under the 'comparative impairment'
doctrine," it was faced with a false conflict. 140 These cases are aber-
rations, however, as most courts carefully follow the method set forth
in the California cases.
IV. LOUISIANA's NEW CONFLICTS OF LAW METHODOLOGY
In 1973, the Louisiana Supreme Court abandoned the lex loci delicti
rule for choice of law.' 4' What the court adopted in its place, however,
remained unclear. The fog was somewhat lifted, with help from then
Federal District Judge Alvin B. Rubin,142 in Ardoyno v. Kyzar where
he explained that Louisiana conflicts law had two distinct steps:
Transp. Inc., 537 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Fox v. Peck Iron and Metal Co., 25
Bankr. 674 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
136. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 745 F. Supp. 79 (D.P.R.
1990); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Ill. 1990);
Thomason v. Mitsubishi Elec. Sales Am., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. Ga. 1988);
Peckenpaugh v. Cargill, Inc., 1986 WL 15610 (D.. Del. 1986); Spano v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 1986 WL 7818 (W.D. N.Y. 1986); National Semiconductor Corp. v. Allendale
Mut. Ins. Co., 549 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Conn. 1982); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc.
v. Bell Helicopter Co., 491 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
137. The Seventh Circuit and three of the federal district courts not in California did
not properly apply the comparative impairment method. Air Crash Disaster near Chicago,
Ill., 644 LF.2d 594; Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 745 F. Supp. 79; Air Crash Disaster at
Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F. Supp. 1425; Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 491 F. Supp. 611.
138. Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d at 621; Air Crash Disaster at
Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F. Supp. at 1431.
139. In re Disaster at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793, 798-99 (E.D.
Mich. 1989).
140. Id. at 804.
141. Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
142. Judge Rubin was later a member of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
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The first is to determine whether a false or true conflict exists.
If a false conflict exists . . . the law of the state that has the
exclusive interest is applied. If the conflict is a true one, the
court proceeds to the second stage and applies the principles of
the Second Restatement to determine which of the competing
interests ought to prevail . 41
Not all Louisiana appellate courts and federal district courts in Louisiana
have completely followed Judge Rubin's explanation of Louisiana con-
flicts law. The decisions, however, follow "two basic patterns: (1) use
of the Restatement Second only to resolve 'true conflicts' exposed by
'governmental interest analysis or a similar process'; and (2) straight-
forward application of the whole of the Restatement mechanism without
first determining whether the case presents a false or [a] true conflict."'"
In 1984, concluding that the conflicts articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code were inadequate and had caused the jurisprudence to be chaotic,
the Louisiana State Law Institute decided to revise Louisiana's choice
of law rules. 4 The result was the adoption by the Council of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, on March 17, 1989, of Law of Conflicts
Laws: A Projet.'" The Projet was formally adopted after editorial
revisions on March 17, 1990. s41 The Projet was submitted to the Louis-
iana Legislature during the 1990 Legislative Session and was passed by
the Senate; however, the House deferred the bill for further study. On
January 12, 1991, the Council of the Law Institute reaffirmed the
Projet, 48 which was once again submitted to the Louisiana Legislature
during the 1991 Legislative Session. The Projet was adopted unanimously
by both the House (99-0) and the Senate (35-0) with only two minor
amendments, 49 and was approved by the Governor on July 24, 1991.150
The Projet provided that Chapter 3 of the Preliminary Title of the
Louisiana Civil Code, which previously contained articles 14 and 15,
would be amended and reenacted, and be comprised of new articles 14
143. 426 F. Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. La. 1976). Judge Rubin also cited and applied Baxter's
comparative impairment method. Id. at 84.
144. Note, Choice of Law in Louisiana: Torts, 47 La. L. Rev. 1109, 1143 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
145. Symeonides, Louisiana's Draft on Successions and Marital Property, 35 Am. J.
Comp. L. 259 (1987). Louisiana's current choice of law articles are found in La. Civ.
Code arts. 14-15 (1952 & Supp. 1991).
146. Louisiana State Law Institute, Law of Conflicts of Laws: A Projet (adopted
March 17, 1989).
147. Louisiana State Law Institute, A Projet for the Codification of Louisiana Law
of Conflicts of Laws (adopted March 17, 1990).
148. Louisiana State Law Institute, A Projet for the Codification of Louisiana Law
of Conflicts of Laws (re-affirmed January 12, 1991).
149. 1991 La. Acts No. 923.
150. Id.
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through 49.'' The new conflicts of law articles apply to all actions filed
after January 1, 1992.112 The foundation of the entire Projet, and, now,
the new conflicts of law book of the Louisiana Civil Code, is the general
and residual article which states:
Except as otherwise provided in this Book, an issue in a
case having contacts with other states is governed by the law
of that state whose policies would be most seriously impaired
if its law were not applied to that issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and
pertinence of the relevant policies of all involved states in the
light of: (1) the relationship of each state to the parties and
the dispute; and (2) the policies and needs of the interstate and
international systems, including the policies of upholding the
justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the adverse
consequences that' might follow from subjecting a party to the
law of more than one state.'"
This article is the most important one in the new conflicts of law book
because "it contains the general principles from which all other articles
of this Book have been derived and in light of which they should be
applied."' 4 There are many similarities between this article and Baxter's
comparative impairment method and the form of comparative impair-
ment adopted by the California courts.
The Projet's drafters also recognized the article's resemblance to the
comparative impairment method; however, they state that the resem-
blance is merely due to the article's "negative phrasing""' and that "to
the extent it is anything more than acoustic, this resemblance is confined
to the most basic premise."' 5 6 According to the drafters, this basic
premise is "that the choice-of-law process should strive for ways to
minimize impairment of the interests of all involved states, rather than
to maximize the interests of one state at the expense of the interests of
the other states."1 7 This, however, is not the only resemblance.
151. Id. at § 1. The Projet also provided that present articles 24 through 85 were to
be redesignated by the Louisiana State Law Institute. Id. at § 2. The Louisiana State
Law Institute subsequently redesignated new articles 15-49 as articles 3515-49 of Book
IV, Conflict of Laws.
152. Id. at § 4.
153. La. Civ. Code art. 3515 (effective January i, 1992).
154. La. Civ. Code art. 3515, comment a (effective January 1, 1992).
155. La. Civ. Code art. 3515, comment b (effective January I, 1992). The negative
phrasing of the article by the drafters is deliberate, and intended to distance the article
from Currie's governmental interest analysis.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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Several obvious similarities can be found in the general and residual
code article itself. The article states that the "law of the state whose
policies would be the most seriously impaired if its law were not applied' '" 8
should be applied to resolve a conflict; in the comparative impairment
method the "law of the state whose interest would be the more impaired
if its law were not applied"'19 is used to resolve a true conflict. That
state, the article provides, is "determined by evaluating the strength and
pertinence of the relevant policies of all involved states in light of: (1)
the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute; and (2)
the policies and needs of the interstate and international systems." ' 60
Similarly, the comparative impairment method requires "ascertaining the
comparative pertinence" of the laws' underlying policies and accom-
modating the conflicting state policies based on the intended scope of
those policies.' 6' Thus, it seems that the general and residual code article
and comparative impairment are actually the same methodology merely
using different terminology.
In a law review article in which he attempts to distinguish the
comparative impairment method from the method used in the new
conflicts of law book, the Projet's reporter, Professor Symeon C. Sy-
meonides, states that the differences between the two approaches "be-
come more evident in the specific rules of the Projet, which deliberately
steer away from the quantitative measurement of the impairment of
state interests that is associated with Baxter's theory."'16 He is wrong.
The comparative impairment method does not advocate a quantitative
evaluation, or weighing, of states interests. In fact, the California courts
have rejected such a weighing of interests." 3 Symeonides, then, uses as
an example one of Baxter's hypotheticals in an attempt to show the
difference between the two methods. Symeonides correctly states that if
a state Y driver causes injury to another Y driver in an automobile
accident occurring in state X while exceeding the speed limit of state
X, then Baxter would not apply the negligence per se rule of state X
because the regulatory interest of the rule would "not be impaired
significantly if it is subordinated in the comparatively rare instances
158. La. Civ. Code art. 3515 (effective January 1, 1992) (emphasis added).
159. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320, 546 P.2d 719, 723, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 215, 219, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859, 97 S. Ct. 159 (1976) (emphasis added). See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
160. La. Civ. Code art. 3515 (effective January I, 1992).
161. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 166, 583 P.2d 721,
726-27, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872-73 (1978) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Baxter, supra note
3, at 12). See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
162. Symeonides, Problems and Dilemmas in Codifying Choice of Law for Torts: The
Louisiana Experience in Comparative Perspective. 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 431, 437 (1990).
163. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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involving two nonresidents." ' " He also correctly states that, conversely,
under new Article 3543, "the negligence per se rule will apply because
it is a 'rule of the road' which operates territorially and because both
the conduct and the resulting injury occurred in that state. ' 1Is Incorrectly,
however, Symeonides stops there. This avoids the fact that if there had
not been a specific rule which addressed the issue in new Article 3543,
the general and residual code article would have to be relied upon and
Baxter's result would be proper under the general and residual article,
new Article 3515.'" Therefore, whenever one of the specific articles of
the new conflicts of law book does not direct a certain result, the two
methods converge and the Louisiana methodology becomes almost in-
distinguishable from the comparative impairment method.
This, however, is not a conclusion to be avoided. It provides Louis-
iana with a marvelous opportunity. Instead of trying to make the new
Louisiana conflicts law an orphan, as the drafters are attempting to do,
we should recognize Baxter as the true father of the methodology on
which the new articles are based. The concern of the drafters appears
to be that Louisiana courts will turn to the decisions based on Baxter's
comparative impairment method as adopted by the California courts.
This should not be a cause for alarm because it does not affect the
application of specific articles in the new conflicts of law book. When
there is an article pointing to a specific result, the Louisiana courts
should follow that article. When there is not an article pointing to a
specific result, however, the Louisiana courts can learn from the analysis
of the California courts and properly apply the new Louisiana approach,
free and clear of all baggage which the California courts have brought
into the comparative impairment analysis.
Although Baxter only intended his method to be used for resolving
true conflicts, and then only beginning with the federal courts, the
method adopted in the general and residual code article is still the
comparative impairment method. In applying the new Louisiana meth-
odology, courts should remember certain factors. The new conflicts of
law book rejects the true/false conflict analysis advocated by Currie's
governmental interest analysis. 6 Therefore, no initial inquiry into whether
only one state has an interest should be done. The court should initially
determine if a code article provides a specific result. If not, then the
164. Symeonides, supra note 162, at 437-38 (quoting Baxter, supra note 3, at 13).
165. Symeonides, supra note 162, at 438. Article 3543, which governs issues of conduct
and safety, provides in pertinent part: "Issues pertaining to standards of conduct and
safety are governed by the law of the state in which the conduct that caused the injury
occurred, if the injury occurred in that state or in another state whose law did not provide
for a higher standard of conduct." La. Civ. Code art. 3543 (effective January I, 1992).
166. La. Civ. Code art. 3515 and comment b (effective January 1, 1992).
167. See supra note 155.
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court should turn to the method set forth in the general and residual
code article. The article provides for the identification of the states'
policies including the states' relationship to the parties and the dispute
and the domestic and multistate policies involved. These factors are used
to determine which state's policies would be most seriously impaired if
its law were not applied.
The problems that commentators found with California's use of
comparative impairment should not arise in Louisiana. Because a Louis-
iana court will not find itself faced with a "true" (or "false") conflict,
it avoids the principle criticism of the California commentators of hastily
identifying a "true" conflict and improperly incorporating Baxter's com-
parative impairment into Currie's step of moderate and restrained in-
terpretation. Thus, one of Kay's main concerns with California's use
of comparative impairment can never be reached in Louisiana.," How-
ever, because a court is to determine the "strength and pertinence" of
the involved states policies, the additional factors added into the analysis
by Offshore cannot be dismissed. The comments to the general and
residual code article indicate that "[w]hat is to be evaluated is not the
wisdom or goodness of a state policy, either in the abstract or vis-a-
vis the policy of another state, but rather the 'strength and pertinence'
of this policy in space."' 69 The comments even advocate looking at the
legislative policy; therefore, the Louisiana courts would benefit from
looking at the history and current status of the states' laws in addition
to their function and purpose. 170 While the comparison to "better law"
analysis seems inevitable, it should not be accorded great weight because
the comments clearly reflect the intent to avoid that type of analysis.
Therefore, Louisiana courts should not be led into a better rule analysis
as Kanowitz said the California courts have done.'
The analysis of the states' policies in the California decisions is a
valuable resource. To ignore this method of analysis simply because of
the drafters' insistence that the Louisiana methodology is not the com-
parative impairment method would be a waste. The analysis by the
California courts after they recognize a true conflict and begin applying
the comparative impairment method accurately reflects the type of anal-
ysis required of a Louisiana court in a choice of law situation.
V. CONCLUSION
Of course, the basis of the Louisiana choice of law analysis rests
with the wording of new Article 3515, the general and residual code
168. See supra notes 76-79 & 83-89 and accompanying text.
169. La. Civ. Code art. 3515, comment c (effective January I, 1992).
170. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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article of the new conflicts of law book.172 Despite the drafters' insistence
to the contrary the new Louisiana conflicts of law methodology is a
form of comparative impairment. The difference is that instead of
applying comparative impairment when faced with a "true" conflict, as
in California, the Louisiana courts will be applying comparative im-
pairment from the moment it recognizes a choice of law problem that
is not resolved by a specific conflicts of law code article. Although its
adoption does not take exactly the same form as Baxter's comparative
impairment or the form used by the California courts, their experience
with its use can provide Louisiana courts with a valuable resource that
should not be neglected.
172. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.

